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EQUAL ACCESS TO INFORMATION:




The Texas Gulf Sulphur decision was the seminal moment in the crea-
tion of the modern federal insider trading prohibition. In the half century
since it was decided, however, courts and commentators have overlooked
the glaring flaw in the court’s analysis.
In the key part of the opinion, in which the court laid out the equal
access standard, the court grossly misrepresented the precedents on which it
relied. The court cited two state law opinions that were wholly irrelevant to
the problem at hand. It cited two law review articles, but those articles sim-
ply do not say what the court claimed they said. Finally, the court made a
bald, unsupported statement of Congressional intent that is demonstrably
false.
The insider trading prohibition thus rests on a foundation of sand.
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AS its quinquagenary approaches, it is appropriate that Texas GulfSulphur (TGS)1 be commemorated by this Symposium and otherevents that will likely occur. As of April 2018, Westlaw reported
that TGS had been cited in 1,055 judicial decisions and 1,300 law review
articles. It was recognized almost immediately as a profoundly important
* William D. Warren Distinguished Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law. I thank
Sung Hui Kim, Donald Langevoort, Adam Pritchard, Marc Steinberg, and William Wang
for comments and suggestions, and Andrew Verstein for going above and beyond the call
of duty. I am solely responsible for the opinions and any errors herein.
1. See generally SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
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decision. Today, fifty years later, it remains one of the most important
and frequently cited securities law decisions.2
I come not to praise TGS, however, but to bury it. After all, the core of
TGS’s insider trading regime lasted just twelve years before it was deci-
sively rejected by the Supreme Court. In TGS, Judge Sterry R. Water-
man’s majority opinion interpreted Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) and
SEC Rule 10b-5 thereunder as mandating that:
[A]nyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing
it in order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do
so, must abstain from trading in or recommending the securities con-
cerned while such inside information remains undisclosed.3
Just over a decade later, however, in Chiarella v. United States, Justice
Powell’s majority opinion expressly rejected that proposition, explaining
that “a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not arise from the mere pos-
session of nonpublic market information.4
Why did the Supreme Court cut the heart out of the TGS? Justice Pow-
ell’s main concern was the risk that broad application of the equal access
test would criminalize legitimate trading activity.5 In doing so, however,
Powell overlooked an even more fundamental problem; namely, Judge
Waterman not only invented equal access out of whole cloth, but also
compounded his fraud by outright misrepresentation of the few prece-
dents he cited.6
In the key part of the opinion, in which Judge Waterman laid out the
equal access standard, the court grossly misrepresented the precedents on
which it relied. The judge cited two state law opinions that were wholly
irrelevant to the problem at hand.7 He cited two law review articles, but
those articles simply do not say what the court claimed they said.8 He
2. ALAN R. BROMBERG, ET AL., 1 BROMBERG & LOWENFELS ON SECURITIES FRAUD
§ 1:16 (2d ed. 2017) (stating that “few cases have been cited more frequently in private
litigation”).
3. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
4. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980).
5. See infra notes 20–26 and accompanying text.
6. A friend who read an earlier draft of this paper defended Judge Waterman’s opin-
ion as an embrace of a new federal common law within statutory domains claimed as ap-
propriate subjects for federal intervention. It is certainly true that federal courts were
proactively carving out a broad federal common law of corporations during the 1960s and
1970s. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69
WASH. U. L.Q. 565, 613 (1991) (“In the early 1970s, courts gave SEC rule 10b-5, designed
originally as a catch-all anti-fraud provision, an increasingly expansive reading that in time
might have led to a federal common law of corporations.”). Yet, even if that process was
legitimate, surely it did not excuse abusing the precedents. Cf. In re Troy, 306 N.E.2d 203,
218 (Mass. 1973) (holding that a judge may be disciplined for misconduct “if it is estab-
lished by credible evidence that a judge, over a protracted period of time, has followed a
course of judicial conduct which is in utter disregard of the law and of established rules of
practice”).
7. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 30–35 and accompanying text.
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misquoted a key SEC precedent.9 Finally, Judge Waterman made a bald,
unsupported statement of congressional intent that is demonstrably
false.10
Oddly, not only did Powell ignore Waterman’s sleight of hand, but so
has the literature since TGS. This essay sets the record straight.11
I. THE EQUAL ACCESS POLICY
The relevant passage of Judge Waterman’s TGS majority opinion is
worth quoting in full, including citations, so that we can thoroughly parse
the court’s reasoning:
Whether predicated on traditional fiduciary concepts, see, e.g.,
Hotchkiss v. Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan.1932), or on the
“special facts” doctrine, see, e.[g]., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 29
S.Ct. 521, 53 L.Ed. 853 (1909), the Rule [10b-5] is based in policy on
the justifiable expectation of the securities marketplace that all in-
vestors trading on impersonal exchanges have relatively equal access
to material information, see Cary, Insider Trading in Stocks, 21
Bus.Law. 1009, 1010 (1966), Fleischer, Securities Trading and Corpo-
ration Information Practices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf
Sulphur Proceeding, 51 Va.L.Rev. 1271, 1278-80 (1965). The essence
of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in the
securities of a corporation has “access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone” may not take “advantage of such
information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is deal-
ing,” i.e., the investing public. Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co., 40
S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961). Insiders, as directors or management officers
are, of course, by this Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but
the Rule is also applicable to one possessing the information who
may not be strictly termed an “insider” within the meaning of Sec.
16(b) of the Act. Cady, Roberts, supra. Thus, anyone in possession of
material inside information must either disclose it to the investing
public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in order to protect a
corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must abstain from
trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such in-
side information remains undisclosed . . . . The core of Rule 10b-5 is
the implementation of the Congressional purpose that all investors
should have equal access to the rewards of participation in securities
9. See infra notes 36–43 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.
11. In order to address an issue raised by some readers of earlier drafts, let me be clear
that this article is intentionally agnostic on TGS’s merits. The question is not whether it
was decided correctly, but whether it was decided honestly. In addition, this article is also
agnostic on the questions of whether the regime Justice Powell created to replace TGS was
correct or based on an honest analysis of precedent. On those questions, see generally
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent Choice Between
Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 SMU L. REV. 1589 (1999) (criticizing both TGS
and Chiarella).
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transactions.12
This passage raised two critical questions: Did the court actually mean
“anyone”? Did it really mean “equal”?
Notice that the quoted passage suggests a possible limiting principle in
the suggestion that liability attached to persons who have “access, directly
or indirectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone.”13 If read literally,
that passage should have precluded most instances of outsiders trading on
market information, but no court ever invoked it to limit the scope of
liability.
In fact, TGS’s progeny quickly expanded the scope of liability. First, it
quickly became apparent that “anyone in possession of material inside
information,” really meant anyone. The prohibition applied with equal
force to outsiders possessing such information as it did to insiders.14 In-
deed, some post-TGS decisions came “close to suggesting that it is inher-
ently unfair for one party to trade with another whom he knows or should
know does not possess certain material information.”15
Second, the prohibition was rapidly extended to include not just inside
but also market information. Market information is commonly defined as
information about events or developments that affect the market for a
company’s securities, but not the company’s assets or earnings. It typi-
cally emanates from non-corporate sources and deals primarily with in-
formation affecting the trading markets for the corporation’s securities.
Inside information typically comes from internal corporate sources and
involves events or developments affecting the issuer’s assets or earn-
ings.16 Within just a few years after TGS, the SEC was aggressively seek-
ing to extend the equal access principle to include the use of material
nonpublic market information.17
Taken together, these developments demonstrate the sweeping breadth
of the TGS prohibition. They confirm that “anyone” meant “just about
anyone” and “equal access” meant “pretty much equal access,” such that
the disclose or abstain rule captured almost all trading by insiders and
outsiders.18 To be sure, no case ever reached the logical extreme of re-
12. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulfer Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848, 851–52 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
13. Id. at 848 (quoting In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961)).
14. See SEC v. Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 631 n.10 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that “it is a com-
monplace that the term ‘insider trading’ is a misnomer”).
15. Arthur Fleischer, Jr. et al., An Initial Inquiry into the Responsibility to Disclose
Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 798, 806 (1973).
16. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Relationship Between Mandatory Disclosure and
Prohibitions Against Insider Trading: Why A Property Rights Theory of Inside Information
Is Untenable, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 149, 154 (1993) (discussing distinction between inside and
market information).
17. See Fleischer et al., supra note 15, at 801–02 (discussing SEC enforcement efforts
relating to market information).
18. Even the Second Circuit accepted some narrow limits on the equal access rule. In
Chiarella, for example, the court acknowledged that the rule was “not to be understood as
holding that no one may trade on nonpublic market information without incurring a duty
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quiring complete parity of information, but the SEC vigorously sought to
push the law in that direction.19
II. EQUAL ACCESS REJECTED
In his Chiarella20 and Dirks21 opinions, Supreme Court Justice Lewis
Powell led the Court in decisively rejecting the equal access rationale in
favor of a new focus on disclosure obligations arising out of fiduciary re-
lationships. As Justice Powell explained in Dirks:
We were explicit in Chiarella in saying that there can be no duty to
disclose where the person who has traded on inside information “was
not [the corporation’s] agent, . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a
person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust
and confidence.” Not to require such a fiduciary relationship, we rec-
ognized, would “depar[t] radically from the established doctrine that
duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties” and
would amount to “recognizing a general duty between all partici-
pants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material, non-
public information.”22
The Supreme Court thus made clear that the disclose or abstain rule is
not triggered merely because the trader possesses material nonpublic in-
formation. When a 10b-5 action “is based upon nondisclosure, there can
be no fraud absent a duty to speak,” and no such duty arises “from the
mere possession of nonpublic market information.”23 Equal access was
thus decisively rejected.
Justice Powell’s principal concern seems to have been the potentially
deleterious impact of an equal access test on crucial market players. He
explained that trading implied a ban that “could have an inhibiting influ-
ence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is
necessary to the preservation of a healthy market.”24 He continued:
It is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze informa-
tion,” and this often is done by meeting with and questioning corpo-
rate officers and others who are insiders. And information that the
analysts obtain normally may be the basis for judgments as to the
market worth of a corporation’s securities. The analyst’s judgment in
this respect is made available in market letters or otherwise to clients
of the firm. It is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of
to disclose.” United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1366 (2d Cir. 1978), rev’d, 445 U.S.
222 (1980). In particular, the court acknowledged that prospective tender offerors purchas-
ing target company shares in the period before they were required to file a Schedule 13D
could not be held liable for insider trading because the offeror “does not receive informa-
tion but creates it.”
19. See Fleischer et al., supra note 15, at 806 (“Although no case has held that there
must be parity of material information between the parties to a securities transaction, there
is evidence of an SEC disposition to push the law more forcefully in that direction.”).
20. See generally Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
21. See generally Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
22. Id. at 654–55 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
23. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
24. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
648 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71
the markets themselves, that such information cannot be made si-
multaneously available to all of the corporation’s stockholders or the
public generally.25
It was in order to avoid chilling such legitimate activity that Powell
sought out a policy rationale that would sweep far less broadly.26 In doing
so, however, he ignored the more serious question of whether equal ac-
cess was valid in the first place.
III. JUDGE WATERMAN’S MISUSE OF PRECEDENT
Recall that the critical passage of Judge Waterman’s opinion cites three
sets of sources: a pair of state common law cases, a pair of law review
articles, and the SEC’s Cady, Roberts decision.27 In addition, the passage
makes an unsubstantiated claim about congressional intent. Not one of
these citations, however, says what Judge Waterman claimed they said.
A. THE STATE CASES
At the outset, the references to Hotchkiss and Strong can be discarded
as utterly irrelevant. Both were decided long before Rule 10b-5 was
adopted in 1943. Indeed, both predated the adoption of § 10(b) in 1934.
Both involved state corporate law rather than federal securities law.28
Accordingly, neither offered any relevant insight into the meaning of
Rule 10b-5. Lastly, neither opinion makes any reference to the purported
equal access policy. Neither opinion even uses the words equal, equality,
parity, or access. In sum, Judge Waterman’s citation of Strong and Hotch-
kiss was a sleight of hand presumably designed to mislead the unwary
reader.29 If so, it was not the last.
25. Id. at 658–59 (citations and footnotes omitted).
26. See A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s
Legacy for the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 21 (1998) (“Powell also recog-
nized that imposing a broad-based duty to the market on tippees such as Dirks could have
a chilling effect on the process by which information makes its way to the market”).
27. See supra text accompanying note 12.
28. Hotchkiss involved an interpretation of director fiduciary duties under Kansas
state law. See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531, 535 (Kan. 1932) (discussing director du-
ties). Strong was decided before the ban on federal common law effected by Erie R.R. Co.
v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the opinion created common law based on “the law
applicable to the Philippine Islands,” which were then a territory of the United States. See
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 430 (1909).
29. A friend who read an earlier draft of this paper argued that the cites to Hotchkiss
and Strong are accurate as they relate to the first part of the key sentence. I disagree.
Recall the key passage:
Whether predicated on traditional fiduciary concepts, see, e.g., Hotchkiss v.
Fisher, 136 Kan. 530, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932), or on the “special facts” doc-
trine, see, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 29 S.Ct. 521, 53 L.Ed. 853
(1909), the Rule [10b-5] is based in policy on the justifiable expectation of
the securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information.
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). I read that passage as
implying that Rule 10b-5 was predicated on the state common law of corporations and that
they inform that policy of the rule. If my reading of that passage is correct, neither implica-
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B. THE LAW REVIEW ARTICLES
Next Judge Waterman cited a pair of law review articles for the pro-
position that Rule 10b-5 “is based . . . on the justifiable expectation of the
securities marketplace that all investors trading on impersonal exchanges
have relatively equal access to material information.”30 Neither article is
particularly authoritative, and, more importantly, neither says what Wa-
terman claims.
The first was not a formal article but rather a mere transcription of
informal remarks by, among other speakers, former SEC Chairman Wil-
liam Cary.31 Cary’s prestige entitled the transcript to some deference, but
a panel discussion surely deserved less deference than a fully thought-out,
formal article. But even if the transcript somehow commanded deference,
there is a more serious problem.
On the page identified by the court’s pinpoint citation (1010), there is
no express reference to equality of information. Instead, there are simply
some general platitudes about the need for integrity and high standards
of conduct. On the following page, Cary states “that insiders having ac-
cess to material information available for a corporate purpose may not
take advantage when it is not yet known to the public,”32 but that state-
ment is not a description of congressional intent, rather simply part of a
summary of the SEC ruling in In re Cady, Roberts & Co.33 In fact, the
words “equal,” “equality,” or “parity” nowhere appear in the opinion,
nor does the phrase “legislative intent.” Therefore, the transcript simply
does not support the proposition for which it is cited.
The second article upon which the court relied was written by Arthur
Fleischer, who eventually became a distinguished and highly respected
member of the New York securities and corporate bar, but was just a
mid-level associate at Fried, Frank when he wrote the article in ques-
tion.34 In the pages identified by the Second Circuit’s pinpoint citation,
there is but a single relevant statement; to wit, “As has been seen, an
essential function of the Exchange Act was to create markets free from
manipulation and from trading based on undisclosed corporate informa-
tion.”35 The supporting footnote refers the reader to footnotes 21–26 and
the accompanying text. But the passage to which one is thereby sent sim-
tion is correct. Unlike Rule 10b-5, the state cases were founded on breach of fiduciary duty
rather than fraud. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
30. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848. See supra text accompanying note 12.
31. See James Farmer et al., Insider Trading in Stocks, 21 BUS. LAW. 1009, 1010 (1966).
32. Id. at 1011.
33. See generally 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
34. See Arthur Fleischer, Jr., Securities Trading and Corporation Information Prac-
tices: The Implications of the Texas Gulf Sulphur Proceeding, 51 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1278–80
(1965). Interestingly, Fleischer was a prote´ge´ of Cary. See Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider
Trading, Chinese Walls, and Brokerage Commissions: The Origins of Modern Regulation of
Information Flows in Securities Markets, 4 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 311, 341 n.146 (2008)
(“Chairman Cary later acknowledged that the ‘ghost writer’ of the Cady, Roberts decision
was his assistant Arthur Fleischer, Jr.”).
35. Fleischer, supra note 34, at 1279.
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ply asserts, without relevant reference to the legislative history, that
§ 10(b) and 16 were broadly directed at preventing abusive trading prac-
tices. Nowhere in the passage does Fleischer identify any relevant evi-
dence of a congressional intent that investors have equal access to
information. Indeed, neither “equal” nor “equality” are used anywhere in
the entire article, while the word “parity” appears in an irrelevant
context.
C. CADY, ROBERTS
Judge Waterman cited the SEC decision in Cady, Roberts, for the pro-
position that “anyone who . . . has ‘access, directly or indirectly, to infor-
mation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone’ may not take ‘advantage of such informa-
tion knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.’”36 But,
even assuming Cady, Roberts had any significant precedential value,
Judge Waterman failed to acknowledge that that decision was far more
limited in scope than TGS.
As to Cady, Roberts’s precedential value, prior to that decision Rule
10b-5 had been limited to insider dealing in face-to-face transactions.37
Indeed, as a leading contemporaneous analysis of TGS observed, prior to
Cady, Roberts the SEC apparently believed that Rule 10b-5 proscribed
only insider trading involving fraud.38 The difficulty this presented, of
course, is that insider trading differs in important ways from the common
law of fraud as it existed when the Exchange Act was adopted.39 As Pro-
fessor Dooley observed, “insider trading in no way resembles deceit. No
representation is made, nor is there any reliance, change of position, or
causal connection between the defendant’s act and the plaintiff’s
losses.”40 Cady, Roberts thus represented a major break with prior SEC
practice effected by regulatory fiat in an administrative proceeding
against a regulated broker-dealer. As such, it provided little precedential
support for the far broader application of Rule 10b-5 effected by Judge
Waterman.
36. See supra text accompanying note 12.
37. See RALPH C. FERRARA ET AL., FERRARA ON INSIDER TRADING AND THE WALL
§ 2.02[1], at 2-15 (1998) (explaining that “early cases . . . involved only face-to-face transac-
tions between corporate officers and shareholders” and that “Cady, Roberts was . . . the
first case in which Rule 10b-5 was interpreted by the SEC to [apply to] market transactions
consummated through an impersonal securities market”).
38. See generally WILLIAM H. PAINTER, FEDERAL REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING
155–57 (1968) (discussing the SEC’s pre-Cady, Roberts understanding of Rule 10b-5).
39. See Donald C. Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of In-
sider Trading, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 429, 440 (arguing that insider trading “is not
really fraud, even though we have chosen to call it fraud in order to preserve and embellish
the useful message of investor protection”); James J. Park, Rule 10b-5 and the Rise of the
Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 365 (2010) (“Profiting at the expense of
shareholders, although it violates fiduciary duties, does not necessarily affirmatively de-
fraud those shareholders.”).
40. Michael P. Dooley, Enforcement of Insider Trading Restrictions, 66 VA. L. REV. 1,
59 (1980).
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Once again, moreover, Judge Waterman deployed Cady, Roberts in
support of a proposition for which it did not stand. Recall that Waterman
cited Cady, Roberts for the proposition that:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own ac-
count in the securities of a corporation has “access, directly or indi-
rectly, to information intended to be available only for a corporate
purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone” may not take
“advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing,” i.e., the investing public.41
Judge Waterman’s quotations from Cady, Roberts in this passage are
highly selective. In full, the relevant passage reads:
Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to in-
formation intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and
not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the inherent un-
fairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing. In consid-
ering these elements under the broad language of the anti-fraud pro-
visions we are not to be circumscribed by fine distinctions and rigid
classifications. Thus our task here is to identify those persons who are
in a special relationship with a company and privy to its internal af-
fairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its securities.
Intimacy demands restraint lest the uninformed be exploited.42
Cady, Roberts thus does not stand for the proposition that the insider
trading prohibition applies to “anyone,” but rather for the proposition
that liability attaches only to “those persons who are in a special relation-
ship with a company and privy to its internal affairs.”43
D. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Finally, Judge Waterman claimed that that Congress intended that “all
investors should have equal access to the rewards of participation in se-
curities transactions.”44 In support of that proposition, Judge Waterman
did not cite the text of the statute, which is hardly surprising because
Securities Exchange Act § 10(b) nowhere mentions insider trading.45
Likewise, he failed to cite any legislative history, which also is not surpris-
ing, because there simply is no legislative history that supports the court’s
41. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968). See supra text
accompanying note 12.
42. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (emphasis added) (footnotes
omitted).
43. See id. To be sure, the TGS defendants all fell within that category, but the TGS
holding was not so limited, and, moreover, the decision has never been limited to its pre-
cise facts. See supra notes 14–19 and accompanying text (discussing post-TGS expansion of
the equal access prohibition).
44. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 852. See supra text accompanying note 12.
45. See United States v. McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 313 (3d Cir. 2014) (observing that
“§ 10(b) does not mention insider trading at all”).
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purported policy.46 Instead, to the extent Congress in 1934 addressed in-
sider trading, it did so via the disclosure and short swing profit provisions
of Exchange Act § 16.47
IV. CONCLUSION
Judge Waterman built TGS on a foundation of sand. He offered no
credible evidence of a congressional intent to ensure that investors had
equal access to information. Instead, he cited precedents of dubious value
and, worse yet, claimed they said things that they simply did not say. As a
result, “[i]n regulating insider trading under rule 10b-5, the lower federal
courts and the SEC” post-TGS were “operating without the benefit of
support from the legislative history of the 1934 Act or from the language
of § 10(b). In plainer words, they . . . exceeded their authority.”48
46. See Richard J. Morgan, The Insider Trading Rules after Chiarella: Are They Con-
sistent with Statutory Policy?, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1407, 1409 (1982) (“Congress failed to pro-
vide any legislative history to guide the §’s application to insider trading transactions.”).
47. See Dooley, supra note 40, at 56–57 (“The conventional wisdom is that Congress
. . . expressed its concern with insiders’ informational advantage by enacting § 16.”).
48. Id. at 59.
